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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore the empirical implications of depart-
ing from rational expectations in very simple money demand models. The
objective is to study the joint distribution of money and prices.
It is well known that in the long run money growth and inflation are
highly related1 but that in the short run this relationship is much weaker.
It has been long recognized that standard rational expectations monetary
models imply a correlation between money and prices in the short run that
is way too high relative to the data in low inflation economies. The reason
is that velocity (the inverse of real money demand) fluctuates too little in
the models relative to the data and so does the ratio of money to prices.
Most attempts at reconciling this feature have explored models with price
stickiness or with segmented markets.2
Recent monetary models of bounded rationality imply more sluggish ad-
justment of inflation expectations than the rational expectations versions. A
shock to money supply is incorporated more slowly into inflation expectations
under learning than under rational expectations. Thus, as long as velocity
depends on expected inflation, as it is standard in formulations for money
demand, velocity will also exhibit more sluggish movements in a model of
learning than under rational expectations. This suggests that a model of
learning can break the strong contemporaneous correlation of money growth
and inflation in the rational expectations model, and it can perhaps bring
the model closer to the data of low inflation countries.
On the other hand, as we show in the main body of the paper, high-
inflation economies display a high contemporaneous correlation of money
growth and inflation. To the extent that we wish to have a model that
can explain the behavior in both high- and low-inflation economies, this
seems to pose a challenge for the use of models of learning since, as we
explained, models of rational expectations do deliver a high correlation of
money growth and inflation. If it turned out that sticky expectations were
able to explain the correlation of money and inflation only in low-inflation
economies but one had to resort to rational expectations to explain the data
1This has been documented, for example, in Lucas (1980), Fitzgerald (1999) and Mc-
Candless and Weber (1995).
2Some examples of papers explaining the relatively low short run correlation of inflation
and money growth observed in the data are Rotemberg (1984), Grossman and Weiss
(1983), Alvarez and Atkeson (1997) and Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond (2001).
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in high-inflation countries, our personal conclusion would be that models
of learning, overall, fail to explain the correlation of money and inflation.
It is not acceptable, in general, to switch conveniently between learning or
rational expectations depending on which assumption matches the data for
each kind of country, but it would be particularly unacceptable to assume
that agents in hyperinflationary countries understand better the behavior of
inflation than agents in low-inflation countries. All the evidence suggests
that agents in hyperinflationary countries find it harder to understand the
working of the economy so, if anything, one has to make sure that a model
of learning is consistent with the observations in high-inflation countries.
The literature on models of learning in macroeconomics has been very
productive in the last two decades3 but the applications of models of learning
to empirical issues is relatively scant. Some references are Chung (1990), Ar-
ifovic, Bullard and Duﬀy (1997), Timmerman (1993), Sargent (1999), Evans
and Honkapohja (1993) and Marcet and Nicolini (2003). Most related to
our work is the paper by Saint-Paul (2001) who argues that a model of
boundedly rational behavior could explain the delayed response of prices to
changes in money growth. As we discuss in detail in Marcet and Nicolini
(2003) (MN) the main obstacle for using models with bounded rationality
to explain actual data has been that there are too many ways of being ir-
rational, leaving room for too many degrees of freedom. A methodological
device that we propose in MN to face this ”free-parameters” problem is to
allow only for expectation-formation mechanisms that depart from the true
conditional expectation only by a small distance. We propose three diﬀerent
(lower) bounds to rationality and show that in a model similar to the one
we use in this paper they become operative in determining the equilibrium
values of the model parameters, therefore solving the free parameters prob-
lem. A key feature of the bounds, is that agents are nearly-rational in the
sense that the expected value of the diﬀerence between expected or perceived
inflation and the true conditional expectation of inflation is very small.4
We show in MN that a nearly-rational model of learning can have very
diﬀerent implications from a rational expectations model in a setup to explain
seiniorage-driven hyperinflations. The learning mechanism we use combines
tracking with least squares, two of the most common mechanisms used in the
literature. That mechanism works well both in stable as well as in changing
3See Sargent (1993), Marimon (1997) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for surveys.
4Rational expectations implies that diﬀerence to be exactly equal to zero.
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environments, so it produces good forecasts both in countries with low and
stable inflation and countries with high average inflation that experience,
from time to time, recurrent burst of hyperinflations. We show in that paper
that, in terms of observations on hyperinflations, the equilibrium outcome
can be very diﬀerent from the rational expectations equilibria only when
the government follows a high average seigniorage policy, which goes along
with high money growth. On the other hand, if the average seigniorage
is low, the economy under bounded rationality has similar implications to
the rational expectations equilibrium as far as the behavior of inflation is
concerned. The reason for this result is that in stable environments, the
bounds imply that agents learn the true structure of the model relatively
fast and the outcome converges to the rational expectations outcome very
quickly. But countries with high average inflation also exhibit very unstable
environments and they have recurrent hyperinflations, as the econometric
estimates we provide in the appendix of this paper clearly testify. In these
changing environments it is much harder to learn the true structure of the
model with simple backward looking schemes, and therefore the equilibrium
outcome can be very diﬀerent from the rational expectations equilibrium for
a very long transition characterized by recurrent bursts in inflation rates.
In this paper we use the same model of learning as in MN, which is nearly-
rational in changing environments, to compare the empirical implications
of the bounded rationality hypothesis relative to the rational expectations
version in high-inflation countries. In our previous work we were concerned
with the issue of whether or not periods of hyperinflations and high money
growth could emerge endogenously. Since we are now concerned with the
correlation of money growth and inflation, and in order to start with the
simplest possible model, here we impose periods of high money growth by
assuming a switching regime for exogenous money growth.5 So, we attempt
5Another recent application of a model with switching regimes in money growth is
Andolfatto and Gomme (2003) (AG). They have a cash in advance model with endoge-
nous capital and interest rates. They focus on a model where agents do not observe the
underlying state of the economy and follow a Bayesian updating rule to form probabilities
of being in each state. This device introduces sluggishness into the expetations formation
process, as our learning algorithm does. Our agents in the rational expectations version
have more information than agents in AG, since they observe the regime each period, while
our agents in the learning version of the model do not see the regime and do not under-
stand the behavior of the economy, so they have less information than the agents in AG.
Another diﬀerence with AG is that we focus on the implications for the cross-correlogram
of money growth and inflation while their focus is on the behavior of interest rates.
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to explain the potential role of sticky expectations in explaining the cross-
correlations of money and prices in high inflation countries.
The way we model the lower bounds on rationality is also diﬀerent from
our previous work. In MN we computed formally learning parameters that
generated good forecasts within the equilibrium, to satisfy a consistency cri-
terion formally defined in that paper. Since the learning scheme that we
used in that paper, that combines tracking and OLS, was shown to perform
well in hyperinflationary environments we use that learning scheme here. In
addition, and given that we computed the equilibrium values for the learning
parameters using the same data from Argentina that we use in this paper,
we import the equilibrium parameter values that we obtained in that paper.
We also show that our main conclusions do not depend much on the exact
value used for the learning parameter values. To the extent that the model
under learning reproduces the observed cross correlations for most learning
parameters we can state that the results are not sensitive to the exact value
of the learning parameters. It is in this sense that we are not subject to the
free parameters criticism that we stated above.
The model has a single real demand for money equation that is decreasing
with expected inflation. The exogenous driving force is the money supply.
We fit a Markov switching regime statistical model for the money growth
rate for five high inflation countries and solve both the bounded rationality
and rational expectations versions of the model. Finally, we compare the
joint distribution of money growth and prices on the model and the data.
We find that the cross-correlogram of money growth and prices in high infla-
tion countries is consistent both with rational expectations and the bounded
rationality hypothesis. Indeed, we find that even though expected inflation
under learning adjusts more slowly to money shocks, it turns out that the
cross-correlations of money and inflation under RE and learning are simi-
lar. This is because money shocks in countries with high inflation are so
large that their variability dominates the variability of expectations. Since
both RE and learning are able to explain the data, this is encouraging for
our longer run research objective of trying to explain the joint behavior of
money and inflation both in high and low inflation countries with models of
nearly-rational learning.
Section 2 describes the model, it explains the reasons that a model of
learning can have diﬀerent implications than rational expectations, it fits the
Markov switching regime to the data, it solves both the rational expectations
and learning versions of the model and calibrates all the parameters. Section
5
3 presents empirical results and compares the models to the data. Section 4
concludes.
2 The Model
The model consists of a demand for cash balances given by
Pt =
1
φ
Mt + γP et+1, (1)
where φ, γ are positive parameters. Pt,Mt are the nominal price level and the
demand for money, and P et+1 is the forecast of the price level for next period.
The driving force of the model is given by the stochastic process followed
by the growth rate of money. This well known money demand equation is
consistent with utility maximization in general equilibrium in a context of
overlapping generations model.
To complete the model one needs to specify the way agents forecast the
future price level. In what follows, we compare the rational expectations ver-
sion with a version in which agents use an ad-hoc algorithm that depends on
past information to forecast future prices. There are several ways in which
one can restrict the bounded rationality, or learning, version of the model
to be ”close” to rational expectations. For example, it has been common
to study the conditions under which the equilibrium outcome of the learning
model converges to the rational expectations model. To be more specific, con-
sider two alternative expectation formation mechanisms in the above money
demand:
P et+1 = Et [Pt+1]
P et+1 = L (Pt−1, Pt−2, ...) .
for a given function L.6 We can then obtain corresponding solutions {PREt , PLt }∞t=0
and, letting ρ(S1, S2) be some distance between two sequences S1 and S2,
ρ({PREt }∞t=0, {PLt }∞t=0) (2)
measures how diﬀerent two equilibria are. If the model is deterministic,
convergence to rational expectations can be written as
lim
t→∞
(PREt − PLt ) = 0
6Strictly speaking, L could depend on the time period, as it does if agents use OLS
estimates, but we leave this dependence implicit.
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When this occurs, the equilibrium outcome under learning ”looks like” a
rational expectations equilibrium in the limit. Only the transition, if long
enough, can then generate diﬀerent behavior in the rational expectations or
in the learning version of the model.
Near-rationality can be interpreted as imposing restrictions on the size
of the systematic mistakes the agents make in equilibrium. This amounts
to saying that agents’ expectations can not be too far away from the ac-
tual behavior of the economy or, formally, it amounts to imposing that the
distance
ρ({PLt }∞t=0, {L (Pt−1, Pt−2, ...)}∞t=0) (3)
can not be too large. In an extreme case, if the function L is such that the
learning equilibrium makes zero mistakes we have that
ρ({PLt }∞t=0, {L (Pt−1, Pt−2, ...)}∞t=0) = 0
Since, by definition, rational expectations requires that ρ({PREt }∞t=0, {P et+1}∞t=0) =
0, the last equation forces the nearly-rational learning to be the same as ra-
tional expectations. If, instead, we impose that the mistakes in (3) need not
be zero but that they have to be small, we impose no restriction on the rela-
tionship between PREt and PLt . As a matter of fact, in some models even if L
is restricted so that (3) is small, the diﬀerence with the rational expectations
outcome (i.e., (2)) can be very large. There may be learning equilibria that
are near-rational and whose equilibrium is vastly diﬀerent from RE. In this
case, the empirical implications of the rational expectations version and the
”small mistakes” version may be diﬀerent, while the learning equilibrium is
still close to being rational, in the proper metric defined by (3).
One example of this behavior is MN. In that paper we impose three
bounds that eﬀectively impose diﬀerent metrics ρ. As we mentioned in the
introduction, if inflation is low, then the only learning equilibrium in MN that
satisfies the bounds is the rational expectations equilibrium. However, when
inflation is high, there are learning equilibrium outcomes that look diﬀerent
from the rational expectations one. In this empirical investigation we focus
the analysis on high inflation countries only; at first sight it seems that it is
in these countries where it is easier to obtain large diﬀerences between the
behavior of learning and rational expectations.
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2.1 A Regime Switching Model for Money Growth
In order to numerically solve the model, we will use learning and money de-
mand parameter values that are calibrated to the argentine economy. How-
ever, as a robustness check, we will also investigate the evolution of the
money supply for other high inflation countries. As we will see, varying
either money demand or learning parameters makes little diﬀerence in the
results. However, the evolution of money supply does make a diﬀerence.
In order to fit the process for the nominal money supply, we first look at
the evidence for five Latin-American countries that experienced high average
inflation and very high volatility in the last decades: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Mexico and Peru. We use data for M1 and consumer prices from the
International Financial Statistics published by the International Monetary
Fund. To compute growth rates, we used the diﬀerence in the log of the
variable7.
While the high inflation years are concentrated between 1975 and 1995
for most countries, the periods do not match exactly. Thus, we chose, for
each country, a sub-period that roughly corresponds to its own unstable
years. Figures 1.a to 1.e plot quarterly data on nominal money growth and
inflation for the relevant periods in each case.
As it can be seen from the figures, for all those countries, average inflation
was high, but there are some relatively short periods of bursts - the shaded
areas - in both money growth and inflation rates, followed, again, by periods
of stable but high inflation rates8. Note also that the behavior of the money
growth rate, the driving force of the model, follows a very similar pattern.
Thus, we propose to fit a Markov switching process for the rate of money
growth9.
7This measure underestimates growth rates for high inflation countries. With this scale,
it is easier to see the movements of inflation rates in the - relatively - traquile periods in
all the graphs. In what follows, we make the case that the data is best described as a two
regime process, so this measure biases the result against us.
8This feature of the data has long been recognized in case studies of hyperinflations
(see, for example, Bruno, Di Tella, Dornbusch and Fisher (1988)).
9Actually, data suggest that during the periods of hyperinflations, both inflation and
the rate of money growth increase over time, a fact that is consistent with the model in
MN. The statistical model we fit assumes, for simplicity, that during the hyperinflations
both have a constant mean. We tried to fit the data to a switching regime model that
allowed for an increasing money growth rate in the high state, but the growth element
turned out not to be statistically significant and sometimes it took the wrong sign. For this
reason we decided to stay with a constant growth rate conditional on each regime. It would
8
Our empirical analysis is based on quarterly data, since we are interested
in high frequency movements in money and prices. Our eyeball inspection
of Figures 1.a to 1.e suggests the existence of structural breaks. This is
confirmed by the breakpoint Chow Test that we present in the appendix
for the five countries, so we model ∆ log(Mt) = log (Mt) − log(Mt−1) as a
discrete time Markov switching regime process. We assume that ∆ log(Mt) is
distributed N(µst, σ
2
st); where st ∈ {0, 1}. The state st is assumed to follow
a first order homogeneous Markov process with Pr(st = 1|st−1 = 1) = q and
Pr(st = 0|st−1 = 0) = p. The evolution of the first diﬀerence of the logarithm
of the money supply can therefore be written as
∆ log(Mt) = µ0(1− st) + µ1st + (σ0(1− st) + σ1st) εt
where εt is assumed to be i.i.d. and distributed N(0, 1). All empirical results
regarding the modelling of the money supply are reported in Appendix A.
One state is always characterized by higher mean and higher volatility of
∆ log(Mt) in all countries. Both pairs (µi,σi) are statistically significant, as
well as the transition probabilities, p and q, and both states are highly per-
sistent in all countries. These results give very clear evidence that modelling
the growth rate of money as having two states is a reasonable assumption.
The rate of money growth in the high-mean/high-volatility state (henceforth,
the ”high state”) ranges from three times the rate of money growth in the
low state for Argentina to nine times for Bolivia while the volatility of the
high state ranges from one and a half times the volatility of the low state for
Mexico to eight times for Brazil. The diﬀerences across states are gigantic.
The high state is always consistent with the existence of high peaks of infla-
tion in each of the countries. These periods are represented as the shaded
areas in Figures 1.a to 1.e.
These results clearly demonstrate that the economic environment can
be characterized by one in which there are changes in the monetary policy
regime.
seem that assuming a constant mean for the growth rate of money in the hyperinflation
regime biases the results against our rational expectations model since, in the learning
version, agents adapt to whatever data is available, while if the data indeed is generated
by a growing inflation in the high inflation regime we are forcing the ”rational” agents
in our model to use a misspecified process for the money supply. To the extent that
our rational expectations model fits the cross-correlogram appropriately, it seems that
assuming a constant expected money growth in both states does not aﬀect our results.
9
2.2 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Rational expectations (RE) assumes P et+1 = Et (Pt+1) ≡ Et (Pt+1 | It) for
all t, where Et is the expectation conditional on information up to time
t. Agents observe all the relevant information in the economy, so that
It ≡(Mt, st, Pt,Mt−1, st−1, Pt−1, ...).
We look for non-bubble equilibria, and we conjecture that in the RE
equilibrium
Et (Pt+1) = βREt Pt (4)
with βREt being state dependent and
βREt = β0(1− st) + β1st.
for some constants β0, β1. To solve for an equilibrium, we must find (β0, β1).
Denote the average money growth conditional on each state by κj ≡
E
³
Mt+1
Mt
¯¯¯
st+1 = j, It
´
. Using the fact that log Mt+1Mt ∼ N
¡
µj, σj
¢
we have
that
κj = exp
µ
µj +
1
2
σ2j
¶
. (5)
and that
E
µ
Mt+1
Mt
¯¯¯¯
st = 0, It
¶
= κ0p+ κ1(1− p) (6)
E
µ
Mt+1
Mt
¯¯¯¯
st = 1, It
¶
= κ0 (1− q) + κ1q (7)
The following lemma characterizes equilibrium prices
Lemma 1
The RE equilibrium in the model of this section is given by
E
µ
Pt+1
Pt
¯¯¯¯
st = 1, It
¶
= β1 =
κ0 (1− q) + κ1q + κ0κ1γ (1− q − p)
1 + γκ0 (1− p− q)
E
µ
Pt+1
Pt
¯¯¯¯
st = 0, It
¶
= β0 = pκ0 + (1− p)κ1
1− γβ0
1− γβ1
which gives the equilibrium price
Pt =
Mt
φ
¡
1− γβREt
¢
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Proof
We have
E (Pt+1|st = 0, It) = pE
µ
Mt+1
φ (1− γβ0)
|st+1 = 0, st = 0, It
¶
+
+(1− p)E
µ
Mt+1
φ (1− γβ1)
|st+1 = 1, st = 0, It
¶
,
=
p
φ (1− γβ0)
E (Mt+1|st+1 = 0, st = 0, It) +
+
(1− p)
φ (1− γβ1)
E (Mt+1|st+1 = 1, st = 0, It) ,
=
pκ0
φ (1− γβ0)
Mt +
(1− p)κ1
φ (1− γβ1)
Mt,
= pκ0Pt + (1− p)κ1
(1− γβ0)
(1− γβ1)
Pt,
= Pt
µ
pκ0 + (1− p)κ1
(1− γβ0)
(1− γβ1)
¶
.
where the first equality arises from equation (1) and the conjecture that
P et+1 = E (Pt+1|st = 0, It) = β0Pt. The third equality comes from (5), and
the fourth comes from equation (1). Combining this expression with (4) we
get
β0 = pκ0 + (1− p)κ1
1− γβ0
1− γβ1
. (8)
From an analogous derivation conditioning on st = 1 we get
β1 = qκ1 + (1− q)κ0
1− γβ1
1− γβ0
. (9)
Solve this system of equations for the unknowns (β0, β1) to get
β1 =
κ0 (1− q) + κ1q + κ0κ1γ (1− q − p)
1 + γκ0 (1− p− q)
and plugging this expression into (8) we obtain the solution for β0.
Plugging this into (4) and (1) we get the equilibrium price. QED
Notice that expected inflation diﬀers from expected money growth in
state 0, due to the presence of the factor 1−γβ0
1−γβ1
(or its inverse in state 1).
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This factor appears because under RE the inflation rate satisfies
Pt
Pt−1
=
1− γβREt−1
1− γβREt
Mt
Mt−1
.
so that if there is a change of regime from one period to the next, the ra-
tio 1−γβ
RE
t−1
1−γβREt
introduces a wedge between the change in prices relative to the
change in the money supply. In this model, therefore, when there is a regime
change, the velocity is not constant, due to the fact that expected inflation
influences the relationship between money and prices. Notice that the diﬀer-
ence between inflation and money growth is larger the larger the diﬀerence in
expected inflations, and that if p+ q = 1 the two possible values of inflation
are equal to the two possible values of money growth in each state.
2.3 Learning Equilibrium
In the model under learning we assume that agents do not observe the state
of the economy, they only observe inflation. We use the same learning mech-
anism as in MN. Let
P et+1 = βtPt (10)
where
βt = βt−1 +
1
αt
µ
Pt−1
Pt−2
− βt−1
¶
, (11)
The coeﬃcient αt is called the ”gain” and it aﬀects the sensitivity of expec-
tations to current information.
If we want to produce a model of learning that reproduces the observed
switching regimes and where agents are near-rational, we need to use a learn-
ing mechanism that produces reasonably low prediction errors when there is
a regime switch. Two of the most common specifications for the gain se-
quence are tracking (αt = α for all t), which performs well in environments
that change often, and least squares (αt = αt−1 + 1), that performs well in
stationary environments. What is a better learning mechanism in an environ-
ment with switching regimes, tracking or OLS?. If agents used pure tracking
they would be making large mistakes when a state has been in place for a
long time, because the regime is not switching and they adapt too much to
money shocks. On the other hand, if agents used pure OLS they would be
making large mistakes after a regime switch, because if this occurred when
12
t is relatively high data on inflation generated by the new regime would be
incorporated very slowly into expectations so that they would take a very
long time to learn about the new regime.
As we argue in MN a scheme that combines tracking and OLS generates
good predictions overall. Since we aim at a model of learning that is nearly-
rational, we assume that agents combine both mechanisms so that the gain
is assumed to follow OLS as long as the forecast error is not large, but it
switches to tracking as soon as some instability is detected. Formally
αt = αt−1 + 1 if
¯¯¯¯ Pt−1
Pt−2
−βt−1
βt−1
¯¯¯¯
≥ ν
= α otherwise
, (12)
where α, ν are the learning parameters. Thus, if errors are small, the gain
follows a least squares rule, and as long as the regime does not switch, agents
soon learn the parameters of the money supply rule. But if a large enough
error is detected, the rule switches to a constant gain algorithm, so agents
can learn the new parameters of the money supply rule faster.
The solution
n
Pt
Pt−1 , βt, αt
o
must satisfy (11), (12) and,
Pt
Pt−1
=
1− γβt−1
1− γβt
Mt
Mt−1
which is obtained by plugging (10) into (1).
2.4 Calibration
As we mentioned before, we calibrate our money demand and learning para-
meters to data from Argentina.10 As a first exploration on how the models
behave with alternative money supply processes, we also solve the model
with the money supplies of other high inflation countries. This turned out to
be a very reasonable exercise, since the sensitivity analysis we did by varying
the money demand and the learning parameters showed them not to be very
important from the quantitative point of view.
10Note that in the current paper we focus on non-bubble equilibria. The Laﬀer curve
mentioned in this section refers to the fact that in our previous paper, with endogenous
money supply, there were two stationary levels of inflation consistent with a given level of
seignorage.
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Money demand
We borrow the parameter values from our previous paper, in which we
use observations from empirical Laﬀer curves to calibrate them. This is
a reasonable choice: since one empirical implication of the original model
is that recurrent hyperinflations characterized by two regimes occur when
average inflation - driven by average seigniorage - is ”high”, we need to have
a benchmark to discuss what high means. We use quarterly data on inflation
rates and seigniorage as a share of GNP for Argentina11 from 1980 to 1990
fromAhumada, Canavese, Sanguinetti y Sosa (1993) to fit an empirical Laﬀer
curve. While there is a lot of dispersion, the maximum observed seigniorage is
around 5% of GNP, and the inflation rate that maximizes seigniorage is close
to 60%. These figures are roughly consistent with the findings in Kiguel and
Neumeyer (1992) and other studies. The parameters of the money demand
γ and φ, are uniquely determined by the two numbers above. Note that the
money demand function implies a stationary Laﬀer curve equal to
π
1 + π
m =
π
1 + π
φ (1− γ(1 + π)) (13)
where m is the real quantity of money and π is the inflation rate. Thus, the
inflation rate that maximizes seigniorage is
π∗ =
r
1
γ
− 1
which, setting π∗ = 60%, implies γ = 0.4. Using this figure in (13), and
making the maximum revenue equal to 0.05, we obtain φ = 0.37.
Money supply
For money supply, we use the estimated Markov switching models we
discussed above. We fit this process to the observed behavior of money supply
to each country. The results of the estimation are reported in Appendix
A. We use the estimated parameters and states as the true values of the
exogenous process, and we assume that these are known with certainty by
the agents. While the money demand parameters are assumed the same for
each country, the money supply process is estimated using data from each
country.
Learning parameters
11The choice of country is arbitrary. We chose Argentina because we were more familiar
with the data.
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The parameters described above are suﬃcient to solve the rational expec-
tations model. However, we still need to be specific regarding our choice of
the (still free!) parameters of the learning process, α, ν.
In MN, we provide an operational definition of a bound of the type de-
scribed above. In that paper we search for values of the parameter α that
satisfy a rational expectations-like, approximate fixed point problem, so that
in equilibrium, agents make small systematic mistakes. In this paper we use
the equilibrium values we obtained in MN for a model with hyperinflations
(α between 2 and 4) and we show the robustness of the results we obtain to
the choice of these parameter values. For the value of ν, we also follow MN,
where we used a value that was roughly equal to two standard deviations of
the prediction error.12
3 Evaluating the models
The main goal of this paper is to investigate the ability of the simple money
demand equation with exogenous money growth to replicate the short-run
relationship between the inflation rate and the growth rate of money in high-
inflation countries, using both the rational expectations model and the ”al-
most” rational version. We dub LM the equilibrium under the learning mech-
anism.
Following the RBC tradition, we characterize the data using empirical
moments of the joint distribution of money growth and prices. Table 1 in
Appendix A.3 presents moments of their marginal distributions. As one
should expect, average inflation is very similar to average money growth in
each country (see, for example, Lucas (1980) for a discussion of this fact).
There are slightly larger diﬀerences between the volatility of inflation and
money growth rates in each country, without a clear pattern emerging from
the table. We will focus our analysis of the joint distribution of money
and prices on the cross-correlogram. If velocity were a constant fraction of
output, in countries where the volatility of inflation (and money growth)
is much larger than the volatility of output growth, the contemporaneous
12We also solved the learning model with an alternative specification for v, given the
Markov structure of the money growth process: we replace v for vst, where, if st = 1 is the
state with the higher growth, we have vl = v and v1 = (σh/σl)v. With this alternative
specification we introduce the switching regime information into the learning mechanisn,
but it did not make any diﬀerence in the results.
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correlation between money and prices ought to be close to one, and the leads
and lags of the cross-correlation should be equal to the auto-correlogram of
the money growth process. Figure 2.a and Figure 2.b present the leads and
lags for the cross-correlation of money growth and prices for the five countries.
It is interesting to point out that money and prices are highly correlated
contemporaneously, contrary to the case of middle and low inflation countries
where the correlation is less strong.13 In particular, the contemporaneous
correlation for Mexico, the country in the sample with lower average inflation,
is substantially lower than for the other countries.
We simulate the model using the calibrated parameters for money de-
mand, the estimated values for the money supply process, and we plug in
the observed values for the money supply. The results of the simulations are
shown in Table 2 in Appendix B and Figures 3 and 4. The columns of Table
2 show the moments for the inflation generated by the model under rational
expectations, and under LM. Under LM we have two columns, one for each
of the two possible values for α = {10/4, 10/3}.
As we can see, the three simulations (the one under RE and the two
under LM) give very similar results for each of the countries. In fact, for
Argentina, neither the mean nor the standard deviation of the RE model are
statistically diﬀerent from the ones generated by the two diﬀerent versions
of LM. Most importantly, none of these moments are statistically diﬀerent
from the actual moments of inflation. The same is true for Peru, Bolivia and
Mexico. Similar results arise for Brazil, with the exception that the volatility
of the inflation rate under learning overestimates the true volatility. It is
interesting to point out that while the simulations for Argentina, Bolivia and
Peru generate volatilities that underestimate the actual ones, the volatility
in the model overestimates the actual volatility for Brazil and Mexico.
Figures 3.a to 3.e and 4.a to 4.e present the leads and lags of the cross-
correlogram between log (Mt/Mt−1) and the inflation rates generated by RE,
LM and the actual one for each of the five countries.14 We also include an
approximation for the confidence band, (±2/√T ) for the cross-correlogram
of the actual series (the dotted lines).
For each country, the cross-correlogram generated with the three models
13See Alvarez, Atkenson and Edmond (2001) and references therein for theoretical work
that aims at matching these correlations for low inflation countries.
14More precisely, for each model or data, the entry corresponding to j in the horizontal
axis of Figures 3 represents corr
³
log
³
Mt
Mt−1
´
, log Pt−jPt−j−1
´
.
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are very similar. Again, with the exception of Mexico, none of the cross-
correlograms generated by either model is significantly diﬀerent from the
actual one. Learning and rational expectations perform equally well in ap-
proximating the actual cross-correlogram. A noticeable fact is that in every
country except Mexico the contemporaneous correlation is lower in the simu-
lated series than in the actual ones. This is because, as we pointed out after
Lemma 1, the two states of expected inflation do not match the two states of
expected money growth, and velocity in the model is not equal to one; since
LM looks fairly close to RE in this model, the same occurs in the learning
model. The only exception is Mexico, the country with the lowest average
inflation, where the simulated contemporaneous correlations are still close to
one but the actual correlation is less than .5 (obviously, the contemporane-
ous correlation is the intercept in Figures 3). Furthermore, Mexico is the
only country which presents significant diﬀerences between the actual and
the simulated cross-correlogram. This is due to the fact that Mexico’s actual
inflation is not so correlated to log(Mt/Mt−1) as it is in the other countries
(shown in Figures 1.a and 1.e), and as the simulated inflation are highly
correlated to log(Mt/Mt−1) they perform worse for this particular case. But
even in the case of Mexico the prediction of the money demand model is not
very sensitive to the expectation formation mechanism: the three models
perform equally less well for Mexico.
The most important conclusion of the paper is that, although sticky ex-
pectations seemed a good candidate to obtain diﬀerent behavior from rational
expectations, the models are empirically equivalent if the money supply is
forced to behave like in the data.
This is not because we forced the learning model to be artificially close
to the rational expectations model by imposing very high rationality require-
ments in the learning model. In fact, both models do imply diﬀerent behavior
for expected inflation. Figure 5 plots expected inflation for the case of Ar-
gentina.15 BETA denotes expected inflation and the labels are the same
as previous figures, thus BETA LM and BETA LM1 correspond to the
expected inflation in the learning model for α equal to 10
3
and 10
4
, while
BETA RE stands for the expected inflation under rational expectations.
The figure shows that expected inflation under learning exhibits stronger
high frequency movements than rational expectations. Thus the real money
demand also moves more under learning. However, the impact on the behav-
15The same happens in the other five countries.
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ior of the cross correlogram is quantitatively small. This suggests that, for
the calibrated parameter values, the role that high frequency fluctuations on
expectations have on the short run dynamics of money and prices is negligi-
ble. Money shocks under the calibrated switching regime process are so large
that they dominate the cross-correlations of money and inflation under both
RE and learning, and the implications for the cross-correlogram are similar
for both models despite the diﬀerences in expectations.
We can explain this situation in terms of the distances ρ that we defined
at the beginning of section 2. In this environment, when the distance be-
tween expectations and actual price under learning (3) is small, it turns out
that the distance between the series generated under learning and rational
expectations (2) is also small, even though the distance between expectations
in both models
ρ({P e,REt }∞t=0, {P e,Lt }∞t=0)
is quite large.
The natural exercise to perform then is to see if the results are robust
to changes in the calibrated parameters. In particular, it is of interest to
simulate the model with higher values for the elasticity. This could give a
better chance to expected inflation to influence inflation and to generate a
diﬀerent behavior of the model under learning. This amounts to increasing
the value of the slope parameter γ. Note however, that the money demand
equation is linear, so we must check that it never becomes negative. For this,
we rewrite the money demand as
δPt =
1
φ
Mt + γP et+1.
Thus, when increasing the value for γ, we also increased the value for δ such
that the money demand was always positive. Note that we are changing the
values for the money demand keeping fixed the learning parameters. This
is not an equilibrium exercise, since the equilibrium values for the learning
parameters do depend on the money demand. The only purpose of this
exercise is to amplify the eﬀects of the sluggish expectations and check if
they go in the direction of better explaining the data. We solved the model
for values of γ between 0.4 and 0.6. The auto-correlograms were already on
the target and there was no noticeable diﬀerence by changing the values of
γ. The following table reports the correlation between the inflation rate and
the inflation predicted by the model for diﬀerent values of the parameter γ.
18
Correlation between observed and predicted inflation for the two models.
γ 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6
Corr(True Inf, Inf RE) 80.85 80.57 80.36 80.19 79.69
Corr(True Inf, Inf LM) 78.12 76.54 73.98 69.92 63.57
The performance of the two models gets poorer as the value of the elas-
ticity is increased. It does worst for the RE model. The reason is that with
RE, expected inflation is a step function. Therefore, as the regime changes,
the price level makes a larger jump. As observed inflation is a smoother se-
ries, the correlation worsens. For the learning model the correlations do not
change much. They get (mildly) worse mainly because after the last hyper-
inflation of Argentina in 1989 the model predicts a sharper drop in inflation
in 1990 than the one actually occurred as the elasticity gets bigger.
This exercise reinforces the conclusion that for the high inflation economies,
our money demand model puts little role for the behavior of expectations. A
possible limitation of our analysis is the linear money demand used, which
is not the one that best fits the evidence. However, exploring with log linear
specifications is far beyond the scope of this paper.
4 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential role of “nearly-rational“
expectations in explaining the high frequency movements between money and
prices in high inflation countries. Sluggish expectations imply movements
on velocity that could potentially explain the observed sluggish response of
inflation to money shocks in low inflation countries. But the correlation of
inflation and money growth in high inflation countries is quite high. The
fact that rational expectations can explain this behavior in high-inflation
countries poses a challenge to models of learning.
We use a learning mechanism that produces good forecasts within the
model, in a way, imposing an approximate rational expectations require-
ment. This insures that the learning mechanism introduced in the model
is not arbitrarily chosen to match the data and it insures that the agents
are not making obvious mistakes in the model. We argue that the learning
model we propose is nearly rational in countries where monetary policy ex-
hibits frequent and substantial changes of regime. We fit a Markov switching
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process for the exogenous driving force -the money growth rate - to five Latin-
American countries. There is ample evidence in favor of the regime switching
structure. We calibrate a money demand equation and we study the solu-
tions of the model under the assumptions of both rational expectations and
learning.
We find that both learning and rational expectations generate very similar
empirical implications that match the observed cross-correlogram of money
growth and inflation for the high-inflation countries considered in almost
every dimension. This result is robust to increasing the elasticity of money
demand. Thus, we conclude, the short run behavior of money and prices in
high inflation countries can be explained both by a rational expectations and
learning models. This is encouraging, because the high correlation of money
growth and inflation observed in high inflation countries does not need the
assumption of rational expectations, so it leaves room for models of learning
to explain the behavior of both high- and low- inflation countries.
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A APPENDIX, Empirical Results
A.1 Chow Test for Structural Breaks
The Chow Test for the corresponding sub-samples generates the following
results
Argentina (1975:01 1992:04)
Sub-samples 1975:01-1988:04, 1989:01-1990:01, 1990:02-1992:04
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1989:1 1990:1 Probability
F-statistic 3.775243 0.002964
Log likelihood ratio 22.09987 0.001161
Bolivia (1975:01 1995:04)
Sub-samples 1975:01-1983:03, 1983:04-1986:04, 1987:01-1995:04
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1983:4 1986:4 Probability
F-statistic 4.205059 0.003498
Log likelihood ratio 16.47067 0.002448
Brazil (1980:01 1995:04)
Sub-samples 1980:01-1987:04, 1988:01-1991:01, 1991:02-1995:04
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1988:1 1991:1 Probability
F-statistic 4.666468 0.001733
Log likelihood ratio 18.12746 0.001165
Mexico (1975:01 1995:04)
Sub-samples 1975:01-1989:04, 1990:01-1992:03, 1992:04-1995:04
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1990:1 1992:3 Probability
F-statistic 4.251409 0.003259
Log likelihood ratio 16.63831 0.002272
Peru (1975:01 1995:04)
Sub-samples 1975:01-1989:04, 1990:01-1991:01, 1991:02-1995:04
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1990:1 1991:1 Probability
F-statistic 16.67572 0.000000
Log likelihood ratio 53.90424 0.000000
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A.2 Markov Switching Regime Estimation Results
In this sub-section we present the results of the Markov Switching Regimes
estimation. Let p = Pr(st = 0|st−1 = 0), q = Pr(st = 1|st−1 = 1), and let µi
and σi be the mean and the standard deviation of the growth rate of money
in state i. The following tables summarize the results of the estimation.
Argentina (1975:01 1992:04)
Coeﬀ. Std Error. t-statistic
µ0 0.175533792 0.018297495 9.593323735
µ1 0.454399941 0.098682095 4.604684802
q 0.915099885 0.066209340 13.82131101
p 0.919361013 0.074032079 12.41841415
σ0 0.072853206 0.011943142 6.100003477
σ1 0.303486106 0.079758969 3.805040466
Bolivia (1975:01 1995:04)
Coeﬀ. Std Error. t-statistic
µ0 0.059627604 0.009754163 6.113041314
µ1 0.536370837 0.420877046 1.274412187
q 0.935126471 0.066531539 14.05538607
p 0.986617102 0.070142749 14.06584602
σ0 0.050541181 0.003716448 13.59932350
σ1 0.373992612 0.159586583 2.343509119
Brazil (1980:01 1995:04)
Coeﬀ. Std Error. t-statistic
µ0 0.157931616 0.027645929 5.712653628
µ1 0.517317340 0.128746245 4.018115930
q 0.926016849 0.125106881 7.401805917
p 0.957205334 0.068582989 13.95689156
σ0 0.045445418 0.019317040 2.352607738
σ1 0.389689368 0.089648053 4.346880447
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Mexico (1975:01 1995:04)
Coeﬀ. Std Error. t-statistic
µ0 0.064677791 0.010181050 6.352762507
µ1 0.206343338 0.021967776 9.393000814
q 0.733328049 0.174816708 4.194839597
p 0.951845883 0.060318779 15.780257828
σ0 0.047614481 0.011171478 4.262147003
σ1 0.061059573 0.025394331 2.404456906
Peru (1975:01 1995:04)
Coeﬀ. Std Error. t-statistic
µ0 0.119329114 0.015084511 7.910632032
µ1 0.744060948 0.190436648 3.985303268
q 0.830803948 0.126355006 6.567003388
p 0.971727572 0.048361910 19.86071300
σ0 0.082091249 0.008656942 10.06842486
σ1 0.383326249 0.134969389 2.847524436
A.3 First and second moments
Table 1 shows the first (µ) and second (σ) moments of inflation and money
growth for every country.
Table 1
Inflation
(∆ logPt)
Money Growth
(∆ logMt)
Sample Country µ σ µ σ
1975:01-1992:04 Argentina 0.146870 0.132087 0.138898 0.117783
1975:01-1995:04 Bolivia 0.069557 0.138701 0.072275 0.117080
1980:01-1995:04 Brazil 0.177091 0.131648 0.174454 0.158965
1975:01-1995:04 Mexico 0.036109 0.029010 0.037837 0.031375
1975:01-1995:04 Peru 0.104011 0.140325 0.095859 0.123695
B Simulation Results
Tables 2.a to 2.e show the first and second moments of the simulations.
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Table 2.a
Argentina
Sample: 1975:01-1992:04
µ σ
True 0.146870 0.132087
α = 10
3
0.142280 0.137145
α = 10
4
0.141884 0.152390
RE 0.144074 0.123287
Table 2.b
Bolivia
Sample: 1975:01-1995:04
µ σ
True 0.069557 0.138701
α = 10
3
0.072237 0.146258
α = 10
4
0.072189 0.161556
RE 0.072755 0.127636
Table 2.c
Brazil
Sample: 1980:01-1995:04
µ σ
True 0.177091 0.131648
α = 10
3
0.164544 0.217368
α = 10
4
0.163226 0.295389
RE 0.180857 0.168293
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Table 2.d
Mexico
Sample: 1975:01-1995:04
µ σ
True 0.036109 0.029010
α = 10
3
0.037844 0.032996
α = 10
4
0.037805 0.033354
RE 0.038116 0.033121
Table 2.e
Peru
Sample: 1975:01-1995:04
µ σ
True 0.104011 0.140325
α = 10
3
0.094706 0.146434
α = 10
4
0.094602 0.161485
RE 0.096507 0.174697
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Argentina: Lag with confidence band
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Bolivia: Lag with confidence interval
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Fig 3.c
Brazil: Lag with confidence interval
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Fig 3.d
Mexico: Lag with confidence interval
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Peru: Lag with confidence interval
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Argentina: Lead with confidence interval
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Bolivia: Lead with confidence interval
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Brazil: Lead with confidence interval
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Mexico: Lead with confidence interval
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Peru: Lead with Confidence interval
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Argentina: Inflation generated by LM, LM1 and RE
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